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‘No politics in the agenda-setting meeting’:
plenary agenda setting in the Netherlands
Simon Otjes
Groningen University, Groningen, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
The process of agenda setting is fundamental to politics, yet there is surpris-
ingly little research about this process in parliamentary systems. The reason
for this lacuna is that agenda setting tends to occur behind closed doors. The
Dutch Tweede Kamer is an exception to this rule: decisions about the parlia-
mentary agenda are made in public. This study examines agenda setting in
the Dutch parliament from an issue-competition perspective. It looks at a
sample of more than 400 agenda-setting meetings of the Dutch parliament
between 1998 and 2017. It finds that opposition parties which stand far from
the government make proposals on issues that they ‘own’; these proposals
are supported by other opposition parties, parties that stand close to them
and focus on the same issue. Coalition parties and parties that stand far away
sabotage these proposals.
KEYWORDS Agenda setting; parliamentary politics; Netherlands; government opposition; issue-
ownership; left – right
Who determines the agenda is a key question political science (Bachrach
and Baratz 1962): a parliament can only make decisions on those issues
that make it onto the parliamentary agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2007;
D€oring 1995a; Laver and Shepsle 1994: 295; Tsebelis and Rasch 2011).
Despite its importance, surprisingly little is known about decision making
on the parliamentary agenda. The reason for this lacuna is obvious. Most
political scientists follow Lukes (1974: 22) in thinking of agenda setting as
a covert way of wielding power: indeed in nearly all agenda setting in
European parliaments occurs behind closed doors (D€oring 1995a).1 The
lower house of the Dutch parliament (Tweede Kamer) is exceptional
because here agenda setting occurs in public (D€oring 1995a). This is a
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unique case that allows one to observe and analyse decision-making proc-
esses that otherwise occur behind closed doors. It is unknown what struc-
tures political competition over the parliamentary agenda. This study
seeks to address this lacuna by studying the agenda-setting meetings
(Regeling van Werkzaamheden) of the Dutch lower house. These are short
public and plenary meetings held at least once a week in which the lower
house is in session. During these meetings, MPs can propose agenda
items for the upcoming plenary sessions and (informal) votes are held to
determine the agenda. The Speaker often tells the MPs “no politics in the
agenda-setting meeting”.2 The Speaker means to say there is no room for
substantive debate, but in this way they appear to be oblivious to the fun-
damentally political nature of agenda setting.
This article studies agenda setting from a party-political perspective. It
builds further on the idea of Green-Pedersen (2010) that agenda setting
in parliament ought to be understood from an issue competition perspec-
tive. That is the idea that parties compete with each other over which
issues are on the agenda. Parties seek to politicise issues that are beneficial
to them and draw attention away from issues that are not. While most
studies on issue competition have looked at the electoral arena, Green-
Pedersen (2010) proposes that it is useful to understand the parliamentary
arena as well: in parliament parties can force other parties to directly
address the issue they raise. The studies of parliamentary agenda setting
have focused on parliamentary questions (Borghetto and Russo 2018;
Green-Pedersen 2010; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Meijer and
Van der Veer 2018; Otjes and Louwerse 2018; Thesen 2014; Van de
Wardt 2015; Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011; Vliegenthart et al. 2011;
2013; Walgrave et al. 2007). There are however a number of drawbacks to
studying the parliamentary agenda through parliamentary questions: not
only are these mostly symbolic tools with little impact on policy making,
they are also not the best way to look at strategic competition, because
one cannot observe directly how parties react to the behaviour of other
parties. So instead of looking at parliamentary questions, this article stud-
ies parliamentary proposals for the agenda and how political parties
respond to proposals of other parties by voicing their support or oppos-
ition or even sabotaging them.
This study focuses on the process of determining which items will be
on the plenary agenda of parliament. Thus, it looks at control over the
topical agenda, i.e. which issues come up for debate in plenary (D€oring
2005). That is, whether parliament decides to allocate time to discuss the
bill on military pensions, to debate an upcoming meeting of the
European Council or to ask questions of the minister concerning the sal-
aries of CEOs. The topical agenda should be distinguished from control
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over the legislative voting agenda; that is, control over the bills that will
be voted upon by parliament (D€oring 2005). The legislative voting agenda
has been studied in greater detail (e.g. Cox and McCubbins 2007; Tsebelis
and Rasch 2011). The two issues, while conceptually distinct, are not
unrelated. D€oring (1995b) shows that control by the government over
plenary time is correlated with its control over the passage of legislation.
This article analyses a random sample of over 400 agenda-setting meet-
ings between 1998 and 2017. Even the fact that in the Dutch parliament
decisions about the agenda are made in public, while in all other
European parliaments such decisions are made in secret, indicates that
agenda setting in the Dutch parliament differs from parliamentary agenda
setting in other parliaments. Despite the fact that agenda setting in the
Dutch parliament is exceptional, an analysis of the decision making on
parliamentary agenda setting here is worthwhile. Because so little is
known about the actual process of agenda setting, even a single case study
can elucidate how parliaments make decisions about the agenda.
Applying established theories from the comparative literature on party
and parliamentary politics to agenda setting allows one to assess whether
agenda setting conforms to or deviates from the established patterns of
party and parliamentary politics. The results found in the Dutch case are
more likely to be relevant for similar multi-party consensus democracies.
This study is guided by a central research question: which parliamen-
tary parties effectively control the plenary agenda of the lower house of the
Dutch parliament? This is answered by looking at three sub-questions:
first, under what conditions do parliamentary parties propose items for the
parliamentary agenda? Parties can respond in a number of ways to a pro-
posal from another party: they can vote in favour, vote against or abstain
from voting, or they can sabotage it. Sabotage is defined here as making a
counterproposal that aims to prevent a specific debate from being held in
the plenary. This can include proposing to discuss the issue in committee.
The second and third questions concern these kinds of responses: how do
parliamentary parties vote on such proposals and under what conditions do
parties sabotage the proposals of their peers?
Issue competition in parliament
Following Green-Pedersen (2010), the recent literature on parliamentary
behaviour has brought in an issue competition perspective (e.g. Thesen
2014; Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011). This focuses on the idea of issue
competition, which has been a prominent approach in party politics for
decades (Budge 2015; Green-Pedersen 2007; Petrocik 1996; Robertson
1976). As Carmines and Stimson (1989: 6) succinctly put it, ‘[a]ll
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successful politicians instinctively understand which issues benefit them
and their party and which do not. The trick is to politicise the former
and deemphasise the latter’. Thus, parties prefer to speak about issues
they are competent on and force other parties to talk about issues they
are not competent on (Walgrave et al. 2015). Political competition focuses
on selective emphasis of issues rather than direct confrontation on those
issues. Many studies of this phenomenon focus on the electoral arena. It
can also be applied to the parliamentary arena: parties will tend to propose
debates about issues they own. So, labour parties will propose debates about
labour market issues. Parties prefer to hold parliamentary debates on issues
they own in order to shift media and public attention on issues on which
they are seen as competent. Meanwhile other parties are forced to respond
to that issue (Green-Pedersen 2010). As Otjes and Louwerse (2018) pro-
pose: parliamentary tools ‘are used in the permanent election campaign
between parties: [they] are the continuation of election campaign with dif-
ferent means’. If a party is able to set the tone in parliament, they may be
able to set the themes for the election campaign. Parties may also have
more strategic reasons to operate like this. A debate request can be used to
maintain ownership of the issue: parties may use it to mark a party’s terri-
tory vis-a-vis other parliamentary parties (Walgrave et al. 2015: 789–90). By
proposing a debate on an issue, parties signal to interest groups, party acti-
vists, journalists and through them to voters that their MPs are ‘working’
on that issue. Proposing debates is not necessarily just motivated by an
issue competition strategy. Parties that write a lot about issues in their
manifestos and seek to talk about those issues in parliament may simply be
intrinsically motivated to solve those policy issues. Green MPs may genu-
inely want to debate the solutions to environmental problems.
This study adds to existing and growing literature that integrates
insights about issue competition into parliament by testing the expect-
ation that issue attention outside of parliament predicts issue attention in
parliament. Studies of agenda setting in parliament have almost exclu-
sively focused on parliamentary questions. The theoretical reason to focus
on this tool compared to other tools MPs have is that the right of MPs to
ask questions tends to be unconstrained by rules. MPs do not need the
consent of a majority of parliament to ask a question. This means that
these can genuinely be taken to reflect the priorities of the party or an
individual MP. A lot of other parliamentary activity is limited by gate-
keepers of some kind. An MP can only propose amendments if a bill is
proposed; they can only propose motions if a debate is scheduled.
Most studies that look at parliamentary agenda setting in Western
Europe look at parliamentary questions, often at written questions. There
is something ironic about this: written parliamentary questions are asked
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outside of the debates, as that agenda is controlled by gatekeepers.
Moreover, as Van Aelst and Vliegenthart (2014) observe, parliamentary
questions are only symbolic and have no or very limited policy conse-
quences. They are still of use to parties, however: ‘they do not have tan-
gible consequences, but their aim is foremost to communicate with the
public’ (Walgrave et al. 2007: 823). Written questions, however, rarely
receive direct attention (Green-Pedersen 2010: 350). Plenary debates offer
a way to communicate with the public, they get televised and are reported
on by the traditional media. The access to the media is crucial, because it
is through the media that political parties build their issue ownership in
the minds of voters (Walgrave et al. 2009). In addition to this, parliamen-
tary debates allow MPs to propose actual policy changes. So by studying
parliamentary debates one can try to shift the study of issue competition
in parliament towards a realm of substantive decision making.
Finally, compared to parliamentary questions, proposals to hold a plen-
ary debate may also be a better way to analyse issue competition.
Competition implies conflict over a limited resource. Plenary time to hold
debates is a scarce resource (D€oring 1995a). There is no limit to the num-
ber of written questions. So parties may be even more strategic when it
comes to scheduling debates in the plenary, in both proposing them and
preventing them. When studying parliamentary questions one only looks
at successful cases and not at unsuccessful attempts to set the agenda:
they cannot study the inputs that went into these decisions or the pat-
terns of decision making, that is, which parties supported, opposed or
even sabotaged the proposals of their colleagues. The strategic value of
plenary debates also comes from the fact that holding a debate forces
other parties to respond. If a party asks a question about an issue there is
no need for other parties to engage with that issue. If a debate is sched-
uled about an issue, it is not just the party that proposed the debate that
will need to address it, but also the other parties. Parties have a strategic
interest in forcing other parties to talk about issues they do not own: they
can make parties talk about issues on which their positions are unpopu-
lar.3 Studying how parties respond to debate proposals of other parties
allows one to examine the strategic aspects of issue competition in a way
that studying parliamentary questions does not allow.
1a. Saliency Proposal Hypothesis: the more attention political parties spend
on an issue in their election manifesto, the more agenda proposals
parliamentary parties will make on that issue.
The success of proposals for the parliamentary agenda is determined
by the other parties, which act as gatekeepers. Issue competition may also
structure the responses of parties to proposals by other parties. But these
run in two different directions: on the one hand, parties may compete
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with each other over which party is issue owner. If one considers issue
ownership as something that may be won or lost, parties may have a stra-
tegic interest in preventing other parties from initiating debates on issues
that they own. Parties may then not allow another party to schedule a
debate on issue they consider their own. On the other hand, parties may
simply be interested in debate issues that they think are important and
may therefore support proposals on issues that they own, independent of
who proposed them. The hypothesis reflects the simpler, positive perspec-
tive, but the positive and negative perspectives have different implications
about how to think about issue competition: do parties fear losing it to
competitors? Or simply prefer talking about their own issues? Do parties
compete for issue ownership or for control over the agenda?
1b. Saliency Support Hypothesis: the more attention political parties spend
on an issue in their election manifesto, the more likely parliamentary
parties are to favour agenda proposals on that issue.
1c. Saliency Sabotage Hypothesis: the more attention political parties spend
on an issue in their election manifesto, the less likely parliamentary parties
are to sabotage agenda proposals on that issue.
Partisan and positional considerations
The existing literature on agenda setting in parliament offers a number of
alternative expectations about agenda setting that need to be taken into
account. In their study of the role of government in determining which
bills are brought to the plenary, Tsebelis and Rasch (2011: 2–3) distin-
guish three ways of controlling the agenda. Firstly, the institutional
method: the provisions of the parliamentary rules of procedure that give
power to individual MPs, minorities of MPs or parliamentary majorities
to affect the agenda. Secondly, the partisan method: the majority coali-
tions can control which bills come to the plenary like a cartel (Cox and
McCubbins 2007). Thirdly, the positional method: majorities can also be
reached because a majority of the MPs prefers some policy outcome over
the status quo. The expectations that can be derived from partisan and
positional considerations will be discussed in detail below. The specific
institutional rules in the lower house of the Dutch parliament will be dis-
cussed in the section on ‘the Dutch case’.
Policy positions
The literature on issue competition in parliament emphasises the import-
ance of differences in priorities between parties. That would mean that
parties that focus on bread-and-butter socio-economic issues have an
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interest to maintain parliamentary attention to those issues, even when
their policy positions on the issue are completely different. This, however
neglects that these parties have different ideological positions that make
them more or less likely to propose or support such debates. When it
comes to making proposals, the role of ideology cannot be wholly sepa-
rated from the composition of the government. The political colour of the
government matters greatly for the behaviour of the opposition (see
Louwerse et al. 2017). A right-wing party is more likely to be satisfied
with what is proposed by a centre-right coalition, even if it is in the
opposition, than a left-wing party is. Therefore, left-wing parties are more
likely to propose debates criticising the government or proposing alterna-
tive policies during centre-right cabinets than right-wing parties are, or
put more generally:
2a. Positional Proposal Hypothesis: The greater the distance between a
parliamentary party and the coalition, the more items for the plenary
agenda the party will propose.
When it comes to voting or sabotage, one can expect policy differences
to matter as well. Parties are more likely to support agenda proposals of
parties that are ideologically close to them, because these parties want the
same kind of policy change that a debate and the subsequent proposing
of motions will allow for. The best way to block a party from proposing a
policy proposal that you oppose is to prevent a debate on that issue and
with that the opportunity to propose a motion on it. Moreover, a party
may agree with the way the issue is framed by the proposing party; a left-
wing party may disagree with the way a right-wing party frames immigra-
tion, and therefore they may be more inclined to vote against their pro-
posal to debate it, even if they think the issue of immigration
is important.
2b. Positional Support Hypothesis: The greater the distance between a
parliamentary party and the party proposing an item for the agenda, the
less likely a parliamentary party is to favour that proposal.
2c. Positional Sabotage Hypothesis: The greater the distance between a party
and the party proposing an item for the agenda, the more likely a
parliamentary party is to sabotage that proposal.
Partisan considerations
In addition to competition between left-wing and right-wing parties and
between parties that emphasise different issues, the distinction between
government and opposition parties is crucial to understanding many dif-
ferent facets of parliamentary behaviour (King 1976). Specifically, in
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studies of the legislative voting agenda, the central idea is that the major-
ity coalition controls the agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2007). One can
expect this difference to persist when it comes to proposing issues to
debate (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). In systems with weak gov-
ernment control over the parliamentary agenda, coalition parties will have
longer, formal agreements before they enter coalition in order to hammer
out deals to prevent disputes between the parties in parliament (De
Winter 1995: 143–4). These agreements will put the government in the
driver’s seat concerning the agenda: the agreement will instruct the gov-
ernment to put issues on the agenda. This means that coalition parties
are in the passenger seat: they will be less inclined to propose issues to
debate. In contrast, opposition parties have a strong interest in proposing
new debates. In particular, they have an incentive to criticise the govern-
ment. They ‘want to attack and are especially attentive to bad news poten-
tially portraying the government as losers’ (Thesen 2014: 368).
3a. Opposition Proposal Hypothesis: Opposition parties will propose more
items for the plenary agenda than coalition parties will.
During multi-party majority cabinets, coalition parties are likely to act
as a bloc in order to maintain the stability of the cabinet (De Winter
1995): the coalition will attempt to deny the opposition control of the
agenda. The ability of a coalition to exercise control over what is debated
in the plenary is crucial for its control over what is actually voted upon:
if a debate is held, motions (called resolutions in some countries) can
be proposed.
3b. Coalition Support Hypothesis: Coalition parties will favour proposals of
the opposition parties less often than opposition parties will.
Coalition parties have a special interest in sabotaging debates, in par-
ticular on issues which are new to the agenda, and on which the govern-
ment has not yet taken a position. By postponing the debate they can
give the government an opportunity to formulate a position and therefore
an opportunity to the coalition to strike a compromise on the issue.
3c. Coalition Sabotage Hypothesis: Coalition parties will sabotage proposals
of the opposition parties more often than opposition parties will.
The Dutch case
This article analyses agenda setting in the Dutch case. According to
D€oring (1995a: 225), the Dutch parliament is the only one in Europe
where decisions about plenary agenda setting are made in public. This
does mean, however, that one has to deal with the peculiarities of the
Dutch case. By no account is it ‘representative’ of European parliaments.
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The fact that agenda setting occurs in the open means that unscrupulous
power plays are less likely than in systems where this occurs behind
closed doors.
D€oring (1995a: 225) proposes a scale on parliamentary agenda setting,
ranging from most to least government control: it can be determined by
the government, as it is in the UK and Ireland; it can be set by the
Presidium of the parliament (as it is in France, Greece, Luxembourg,
Portugal and Switzerland); it can be decided on by the Presidium with
the right of the parliamentary majority to overturn it (as is the case in
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Norway and Spain); it can be determined by
the Speaker (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Italy and Sweden); or it can be
decided on in the plenary.4 Government control over the parliamentary
agenda is strongly correlated with the level of consensus democracy
(Tsebelis 2002).5
Two actors are involved in the formal agenda setting in the Second
Chamber: the Speaker and the plenary. The Speaker is elected by a parlia-
mentary majority. Since 2002, these elections have been open and com-
petitive. Speakers are often member of coalition parties, but this is not
necessarily the case. Decisions about the parliamentary agenda are made
in the plenary. Every plenary session is opened by an agenda-setting
meeting (Tweede Kamer 2016: art. 54). During these planning meetings
any MP or the Speaker can propose to hold parliamentary debates and
other MPs can express support for holding such debates. The Speaker
starts these sessions by scheduling plenary reports of committee meetings
or debates on legislation. The decision to hold these debates is not (or at
least no longer) controversial since they build on earlier decisions in the
committees. Therefore, these decisions are made by consensus. There may
be a political process of decision making about when to schedule legisla-
tion or committee meetings, but this does not occur in the public plenary
agenda-setting meetings. Rather it occurs behind the closed doors of
meetings of the coalition parties. Decisions about the proposals are made
after short debates: spokespersons of parliamentary parties express their
support for specific debates verbally on behalf of all members of their
group. The Speaker keeps a tally of the support, assuming that every MP
represents their entire party.
Effectively, there are four kinds of debates. Table 1 provides an over-
view of shares of the debate requests in the sample:
1. A legislative debate (plenaire behandeling): most bills are debated
only in the plenary (Tweede Kamer 2016: arts. 43, 91, art. 101.1).6
Debates on legislation tend to be proposed by the Speaker at the
beginning of the agenda-setting sessions and these are almost always
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added to the agenda without a vote. This means the political process
of scheduling legislative and non-legislative plenary debates is
divorced from the political process of scheduling legislative plenary
debates. During the period under study 98% of bills were proposals
by the government and only 2% were initiatives by individual MPs.
2. A majority debate (meerderheidsdebat): this is a debate on any issue
scheduled with the support of a majority. Majority debates include
debates on any document other than a bill sent to parliament without
a preceding committee debate.7 When setting the timetable majority
debates are given priority over 30-member debates.
3. A 30-member debate (dertigledendebat): this is a debate on any sub-
ject. As the name implies, the support of 30 members (20% of MPs)
is required to plan a 30-member debate. It was added to standing
orders on 31 March 2004. In the same revision of the parliamentary
procedures, the number of MPs necessary to hold an interpellation
(interpellatie) was lowered from 76 to 30. There is one key difference
between an interpellation and a 30-member debate: An interpellation
is held as soon as possible, while a 30-member debate is put on the
bottom of the list of debates (Tweede Kamer 2016: arts. 54a, 133).
4. A plenary report of a general committee meeting (verslag algemeen
overleg): MPs cannot propose motions during general committee
meetings; they can only do so during the plenary. A plenary report is
a short plenary session where MPs can propose motions. The same is
true for a report of a written committee meeting (verslag schriftelijk
overleg), a formal exchange of thoughts between committee members
and the government via writing. (Tweede Kamer 2016: art. 4). A sin-
gle MP has the right to have a plenary report for a commit-
tee meeting.
The agenda-setting meetings are somewhat informal. Spokespersons
can do more than express their support for or opposition to a debate;
they can also make other comments, react to other MPs or make their
support conditional. They may propose to debate the issue in an alterna-
tive venue such as in the committee. They can propose to add the issue
Table 1. Kinds of items proposed.
Items Percentage
Legislative Debate 30% [28, 32]
Plenary Report of a General Committee Meeting 29% [27, 31]
Majority Debate 22% [20, 24]
Thirty-Member Debate 14% [12, 16]
Plenary Report of Written Committee Meeting 2% [1, 2]
Interpellation 1% [1, 2]
Others 2% [1, 3]
With 95% confidence interval.
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to another plenary debate. They could also request a letter from the cab-
inet before the debate can be scheduled. This document could defuse the
political issue at hand or simply postpone a debate so that the coalition
can come up with a solution or so that the issue is no longer salient. All
these alternatives can give other MPs a reason not to back the proposal to
put an item on the agenda. Proposing these alternatives is considered
sabotage in this study. As the process of agenda setting is somewhat
informal, spokespersons also have the option of not speaking out. What
abstaining from the discussion meant has changed over time. Before the
introduction of 30-member debates, the informal rule was: ‘if you agree,
you do not have to speak out’.8 After the introduction of the 30-member
debates, if MPs do not speak out, their parliamentary party was counted
as against the debate. Therefore one could expect parties to abstain less
after 2004. Also it seems likely that, after the introduction of 30-member
debates, opposition parties will have proposed more debates. The intro-
duction of 30-member debates also means that the coalition control over
the plenary agenda may have weakened after 2004.
Methodology
This article looks at agenda-setting meetings of the lower house of the
Dutch parliament between the 1998 and 2017 parliamentary elections.
These data have been collected manually from the website that hosts the
minutes of the Dutch parliament (Offici€ele Bekendmakingen 2018). Over
400 of these were randomly sampled (21%). Table 2 shows how the strati-
fied random sample was divided over the periods. A database was made
with all the proposals for parliamentary debates held during these ses-
sions. For each proposal, it was noted who made the proposal, what kind
of debate was proposed, what the debate concerned, whether spokesper-
sons of other parliamentary parties supported or opposed the debate, the
date of the session and finally to what extent MPs attempted to sabotage
the process. 1760 proposals for agenda items were obtained. These form
the ‘random sample’ of agenda proposals that this study is based on.
Appendix 1 shows the kind of text used and what kind of information
was extracted. It also illustrates a successful sabotage attempt. Of the 1760
proposals, 66% were made by a spokesperson and 34% by the Speaker;
91% concern the proposal to add a plenary debate, and the other 9% con-
cerns proposals to remove or reschedule a debate.
Two different kinds of analyses are performed. The first aims to
explain how many proposals each parliamentary party makes concerning
a specific issue per parliamentary term. To this end, every agenda pro-
posal was categorised according to the Dutch coding book of the
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Comparative Agenda Project (Breeman and Timmermans 2008). The cat-
egorisation scheme employed was developed for the US case in the influ-
ential study of Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and has since been
developed for comparative use (Baumgartner et al. 2006). The categories
used are listed in Appendix 2. These data concern 1254 party‒issue‒per-
iod triads. To test the Saliency Proposal Hypothesis, a data set was
employed which looked at the share of each party’s election manifesto
that concerned the same issue categories (Green-Pedersen and Otjes
2017). The attention devoted to the issue variable reflects the share of
each manifesto of that party devoted to that issue in the election before
that period. To test the Positional Proposal Hypothesis, the policy position
of the party on the general left‒right dimension was drawn from
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey that was closest to the election. The abso-
lute distance between this and the weighted mean of the CHES general
left‒right position of the coalition parties was then calculated. To test the
Opposition Proposal Hypothesis a variable was created: that is, 1 if the
party is in the coalition for the majority of that period and 0 if it was
not. This means that parties are incorrectly categorised during periods of
cabinet formation or when they left government, but during those periods
of caretaker government considerably less parliamentary debates are
scheduled, so this incorrect categorisation is unlikely to impact on the
conclusion. This analysis includes three control variables. Firstly, whether
the parliamentary term preceded or came after the introduction of 30-
member debates. To accurately test this, the 2003–2006 term was divided
into two parts – before and after 31 March 2004. Secondly, the duration
of the term in days, as parties have more opportunities to propose debates
during longer terms. Thirdly, the number of MPs, because parliamentary
parties are more likely to want schedule debates if they have more MPs.
All independent variables were recalculated between 0 and 1 to aid inter-
pretation. A negative binomial multilevel analysis with random effects for
every party‒period combination was employed. The choice for the nega-
tive binomial model is due to the fact that the count data is clearly over-
dispersed (as can be seen from the descriptive data in Table 3). The
choice for a multilevel analysis is because data on ideological position and
coalition participation are the same for every party‒year combination.
Table 2. Number of agenda-setting meetings.
Start End Total Sample Requests
1998 2002 390 82 214
2002 2003 62 14 45
2003 2006 388 79 261
2006 2010 362 76 304
2010 2012 229 48 249
2012 2017 623 132 687
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Many of the same variables return for the second analysis, which looks
at how the spokespersons of parliamentary parties reacted to every pro-
posal. There are 6720 vote choices. Spokespersons have three options:
speaking out in favour of the debate, speaking out against or abstaining
from the discussion. To model these choices three separate binomial
multilevel logistic regressions were employed: one on the choice to abstain
(as opposed to express a preference); one on the choice to vote in favour
(as opposed to abstaining or expressing a preference against); and one on
the choice to vote against (as opposed to abstaining or voting in favour).
Proposals where no MP spoke out were excluded. These mostly concern
the proposal by the Speaker to schedule reports of general committee
meetings or legislative debates. The exact same analysis was performed
for the choice of spokespersons to sabotage the proposal of another MP,
by proposing to discuss the issue in a committee meeting, during a spe-
cific other plenary debate or requiring a letter from the government
before agreeing to a debate. Only the party that initiated the sabotage
action was coded and not the parties that joined in the sabotage action,
as those very often are all of the parties that voted against the proposal.
There are 294 cases of (attempted) sabotage by another spokesperson.
Table 4 provides the descriptive data for this analysis. The analysis is
cross-nested; votes occur within party‒term dyads and proposals.
To test the Issue Support Hypothesis and Issue Sabotage Hypothesis, the
importance every party attached to the issue was drawn from the
same CAP database. To test the Positional Support Hypothesis and
Positional Sabotage Hypothesis, the distance is calculated between the gen-
eral left‒right position of the party, drawn from the CHES that was clos-
est to the election in which the parliament was elected and the CHES
general left‒right position of the party that proposed the agenda item. To
test the Coalition Support Hypothesis and Coalition Sabotage Hypothesis a
variable was created that was 1 if the party was in the coalition at the
Table 3. Descriptives for analysis of agenda proposals.
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. Low High N
Number of proposals 0.84 0.00 2.08 0 38 Zero proposals 38 proposals 1273











Party size 0.32 0.16 0.32 0 1 Small (2) Large (45) 1273
Attention devoted
to the issue




0.60 – – 0 1 Before 31/3/2004 After 31/3/2004 1273
Length of the period 0.53 0.51 0.35 0 1 Short (252 days) Long (1645 days) 1273
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time of the informal vote, 0 if not. This analysis includes two control var-
iables. Firstly, whether the proposal was made after the introduction of
30-member debates: parties are likely to abstain less often after this was
introduced. Secondly, party size: the smaller a parliamentary party is, the
more likely it is that its representatives will not participate in the discus-
sions simply because its members are occupied elsewhere.
Proposing items for the agenda
This study collected 1760 proposals to amend the parliamentary agenda.
The Speakers made 588 (34%) of these. Of the proposals by the Speaker,
85% were to debate bills in the plenary; 99% were granted without debate.
The remaining two-thirds were made by a spokesperson. The following
analyses will focus on these proposals. Just less than half of these were
proposals concerning a plenary debate after a committee meeting (45%).
A third were proposals on majority debates (31%). A fifth were proposals
concerning 30-member debates or interpellations (19%). The remainder
mainly concerned legislative debates (4%). Below we will return to the
role of Speaker.
This section analyses the number of items that party spokespersons
proposed for the parliamentary agenda per issue category across six
Table 4. Descriptives for analysis of votes on agenda proposals.
















0.23 – – 0 1 In favour
or abstain
Against 6720
























Party Size 0.29 0.23 0.31 0 1 Small (2) Large (45) 6720
Attention devoted
to the issue




0.95 – – 0 1 Before 31/3/2004 After 31/3/2004 6720
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periods. A multilevel negative binomial regression with random effects for
the party‒period dyads is shown in Table 5. First, the Saliency Proposal
Hypothesis holds that parties that devote more attention to an issue are
more likely to propose agenda items on that issue. The idea is that
requesting debates on a certain topic is a way to maintain issue owner-
ship. This is indeed the case. If one moves from the party that spends the
least attention to an issue in their manifesto to the party that spends the
most attention to an issue in their manifesto, the number of proposals for
the agenda made by that party in parliament, becomes 40 times higher.
Note that the party that spends the most attention to an issue is the level
of attention that the ‘single issue’ Party for the Animals spend on agricul-
ture in 2006. The latter is of course an extreme case, but the relationship
actually becomes stronger outliers are removed. Secondly, the Positional
Proposal Hypothesis proposes that the further a party is from the policy
position of the government, the more likely it is that they would propose
agenda items. As right-wing parties are more likely to be dissatisfied with
the policy of a centre-left cabinet than left-wing parties, they are more
likely to make proposals. This is indeed the case. The parties that are fur-
thest from the mean of the coalition parties are five times as likely to
make proposals.
Thirdly, the Opposition Proposal Hypothesis is tested: opposition parties
are more likely to propose items for the parliamentary agenda, as they
create opportunities to criticise the government. This is indeed the case:
coalition parties propose about 60% fewer items for the agenda than
opposition parties.
A number of control variables were also included: as the time periods
have different lengths, a control for the length of the period seems obvi-
ous: during the longest period (1645 days) parties proposed more than six
times more agenda items than during the shortest period (252 days). The
analysis also took into account party size: the idea is that parties with
Table 5. Analysis of agenda proposals.
Variable Model 1
Intercept 4.22 (0.34)
Coalition party 0.97 (0.30)
Distance to the weighted coalition mean 1.62 (0.40)
Party size 2.59 (0.38)
Attention devoted to the issue 3.73 (0.45)
After introduction of thirty-member debates 0.80 (0.23)
Length of the period 2.02 (0.32)
N 1254
N parties term 66
Intercepts (parties term) 0.37 (0.61)
Log-likelihood 1234
Multilevel negative binomial regression with random intercepts for every party  term combination
0.1 > > 0.05 > 0.01 > 
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more spokespersons have more capacity to request plenary debates. This
is indeed the case. The largest parties (45 seats) made twelve times more
proposals for a debate than the smallest parties (2 seats). Finally, and
most substantially, there is the effect of change in the institutional con-
text: allowing minority MPs to request debates increases the number of
debates. The number of debate requests under the system with 30-mem-
ber debates was twice as high as the number of debate requests before.
Decision making on items for the agenda
After a spokesperson has made a proposal, two things can happen: either
the Speaker can grant the proposal or an informal round of voting can
occur. When it comes to the 1167 proposals made by a spokesperson, 522
(45%) were granted without a round of voting; 92% of these were pro-
posals to hold a plenary meeting following a committee meeting. This
analysis focuses on the remaining 645 proposals (55%) where some form
of voting did occur. More than half of these proposals concerned majority
debates (55%). A third concerned 30-member debates (33%). The remain-
ing proposals concerned both committee debates and legislative debates
(7% and 5%).
Spokespersons have four options when a proposal item comes up: they
can choose not to participate in the discussion, to speak out in favour of
the proposal, to speak out against, or to speak out against and initiate
sabotage by making a counterproposal to scheduling a plenary debate.
Four multilevel logistic regression analyses with random effects for the
party‒year dyads and for the proposal voted on were used to evaluate
these options (see Table 6).
The analyses test three hypotheses concerning voting. Firstly, the ques-
tion whether the competition between parties is over issue ownership or
agenda control. If parties compete over issue ownership, one would
expect that parties would react negatively to another party proposing a
new item for the agenda on an issue they own. They may fear losing con-
trol over the issue. If parties compete for agenda control, they will vote in
favour of a proposal to debate an issue they prioritise, independent of
who made it. When moving from the party that paid the least attention
to an issue to the party that devoted the most attention to that issue, the
chance of it supporting the proposal increases by more than 600%. Again,
the party that devoted the most attention to an issue was the single-issue
Party for the Animals. The effect remains strong, significant and in the
correct dimension if the outliers are removed. The same change in atten-
tion to an issue decreases the chance of abstaining by 90%. It does not
affect the chance of voting against. This is clear support for the idea that












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































parties compete with other parties over control over the issue agenda, not
ownership of the issue itself. Secondly, parties that are close to each other
ideologically are more likely to support each other’s proposals for the
agenda. This is also supported by the evidence: the left-wing Socialist
Party is 95% less likely to support proposals of the radical right-wing
populist Freedom Party than a proposal from a party that has the same
ideological position as itself. In line with this finding, moving the same
distance increases the chance of abstaining by almost 500% and the
chance of voting by almost 700%.
Finally, opposition parties are likely to vote in favour of proposals of
other opposition parties and coalition parties are more likely to vote in
favour of proposals of other coalition parties. There is support for this: if
a party is on the same side of the coalition‒opposition division as the
party that proposed it, it is three times as likely to support its proposal.
In line with this finding, parties are about 40% less likely to abstain on a
proposal made from the same side of the coalition‒opposition divide and
about 60% less likely to vote against it.
Two control variables were included: firstly, party size. The largest
party in the data set is 96% less likely to abstain compared to the smallest
party under study. Likewise, it increases the chance of speaking out either
in favour (by more than 300%) or against (by almost 1400%). Secondly,
the possibility of holding 30-member debates. This makes abstaining 45%
less likely and doubles the chance of voting against, but does not affect
voting in favour. This means that with the introduction of 30-member
debates parliamentary parties moved from not speaking out to explicitly
opposing new items for the agenda.
Finally, the hypotheses concerning the initiation of sabotage are tested.
This is whether a party in response to an agenda proposal of another
party is the first to propose an alternative to the debate. The analysis
examines the first party initiating the sabotage. The expectations mirror
those of voting favour: firstly, there is no support for the hypothesis con-
cerning issue ownership. There is no effect of the attention a party
devoted to an issue and the chance that it initiates sabotage on that issue.
Second, coalition parties are likely to sabotage proposals made by the
opposition and vice versa. Being on opposite sides of this divide makes it
40% more likely to sabotage a proposal. More important for initiating a
sabotage is ideological distance: a party is twice as likely to sabotage a
debate proposal from a party that is most distant from itself than a pro-
posal made by a party that has the same ideological position. There is a
strong effect of size: the largest party is 24 times more likely to initiate
sabotage than the smallest party. This may be because sabotaging a debate
will diminish the goodwill a party has and smaller parties have greater
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need of the goodwill of other parties in order to have their own proposals
(for the plenary agenda) adopted, while larger parties can, for instance,
ask for a 30-member debate on their own.
Who has effective control over the plenary agenda?
The final question of this study is who controls the agenda of the lower
house of the Dutch parliament? Figure 1 sheds some light on this. It
shows what proportion of actually adopted proposals to put an item on
the agenda was made by the coalition, by the opposition or by the
Speaker. Before the introduction of 30-member debates, the Speaker made
three out five successful proposals. The opposition made a quarter. After
the introduction of 30-member debates, more than half of the successful
proposals for the agenda were made by an opposition spokesperson. The
Speaker made a third of the successful agenda proposals. The introduction
of 30-member debates has shifted agenda control away from the Speaker
and towards the opposition. The Speaker mainly makes proposals that are
no longer controversial, as they build on earlier work in committees.
Speaker Coalition Opposition
Share of Succesful Proposals before and after











Figure 1. Successful agenda proposals before and after the introduction of thirty-
member debates.
With 95% confidence interval.
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These are adopted unanimously without discussion. After the introduction
of 30-member debates, the opposition completely dominated agenda set-
ting in the lower house of the Dutch parliament. The ability of the coali-
tion to keep control over the agenda has dwindled, the opposition is
essentially stealing the show.9
Conclusion
The Dutch Tweede Kamer is an exceptional case because the formal pro-
cess of agenda setting occurs in the plenary of this parliament, while in
all other European parliaments such decisions are made behind closed
doors. This has allowed for this study to take place. In the plenary deci-
sions are made to hold all kinds of debates, but the proposals to debate
laws are often decided upon by consensus and real decision making
mainly concerns non-legislative debates. This study thus was able to
observe part of the agenda-setting process, but not all of it. The fact that
decisions about the agenda in the Dutch parliament are (partially) made
in public is in itself already a sign of weak agenda control by the coalition
government (D€oring 1995a). The Dutch parliament is characterised by its
consensual mode of operation, a stark contrast with some other European
parliaments, such as the House of Commons (2017). The Netherlands are
unlikely to be a representative case for the whole of Europe in terms of
its agenda setting. Still, it is a crucially important case for empirical
research, because so little is known about the actual patterns of agenda
setting. Moreover, Dutch patterns may be similar to other more consen-
sual systems such Sweden, where coalition and opposition party groups
are consulted in the process of agenda setting, or Germany where the
decisions are made by the €Altestenrat, where all parties are represented.
This study shows a number of things that are likely to be the case in
such systems. The key finding of this study is that the key expectations
from the issue-competition approach to parliamentary behaviour are sup-
ported: parties tend to propose agenda items on issues that they find
important. They prefer that parliament debates issues that they prioritise.
This result confirms earlier findings in this literature. This article however
looked at parliamentary agenda setting as competition over a limited
resource and also examined how parties responded to the proposals of
other parties. When a particular party is faced with the question whether
to support a debate proposal of another party on an issue that this first
party prioritises, the party is much more likely to support the proposal
than not. So, parties prefer parliament to talk about an issue they think is
important and do not vote down debates by other parties on issues they
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own in order to ensure that they maintain issue ownership. In short, par-
ties are competing for limited plenary time, not over ownership of issues.
Other elements than issue competition play a role in parliamentary
agenda setting: coalition parties are occupied with attempting to block
such proposals, by speaking out against these proposals, by staying silent
during these meetings (therefore denying the proposals the necessary
majorities), by sabotaging proposals for new agenda items or by outright
opposing new agenda items. The coalition parties try to deny opposition
parties the chance to hold debates on their issues. Secondly, while cooper-
ation within the coalition is strong, it is not the only pattern: ideology
also plays a role in agenda setting, in terms of both positional differences
between parties and issue priorities: so, the greater the distance between a
party and the government, the more likely it is that that party will make
agenda proposals. Moreover, parties tend to support agenda proposals
from parties that are close to them and sabotage agenda proposals from
parties that are far away from them.
So instead of there being no place for politics in the agenda-setting
meeting, it is clearly a forum for ‘party politics as usual’. When made vis-
ible, the often invisible patterns of decision making on whether to place
an issue on the agenda do not differ greatly patterns of decision making
on issues that are on the agenda, which can be observed. Given that
agenda setting reflects established patterns from party and parliamentary
politics about the division between coalition and opposition, left and right
and issue competition, it seems reasonable that those dynamics also play
a role in agenda setting in other parliaments. This means that similar pat-
terns are likely to occur behind closed doors.10 So it seems likely that in
the €Altestenrat of the German Bundestag in the 2009–2013 period,
B€undnis ’90/Die Gr€unen proposed more agenda items on the environmen-
tal issues than on issues related to business. Moreover, it seems likely that
as an opposition party it proposed more agenda items than the Freie
Demokratische Partei, which was in government at the time. These
expectations would have been fair before this study and these results cor-
roborate them.11
What is exceptional in the Dutch case is the power that minorities
have to determine the agenda. These rights are so strong that the coali-
tion has little actual control over the agenda: with the introduction of 30-
member debates, control over the agenda shifted away from the Speaker
to the opposition, which currently makes more than half of successful
proposals for the agenda The situation before the introduction of 30-
member debates is more likely to be representative of what happens in
other consensus systems where agenda setting is not completely monopo-
lised by the government: a majority of what actually comes to the plenary
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is not controversial because it reflects work already done at the committee
level.
What is perhaps most notable about this analysis is that control over
the plenary agenda and control over the legislative agenda are completely
divorced: the government has the lead in proposing legislation and the
opposition has the lead in proposing parliamentary debates. This is a
peculiar way for the Dutch parliament to strike a balance between ‘the
right of the majority to govern and the right of minorities to be heard’
(Huber 1994: 1): a minority can use the bully pulpit of the plenary to
voice its opinion on any pressing matter and get responses from coalition
parties. Opposition parties can use these debates to criticise government
policy but they cannot really use them to shape policy: they can only pro-
pose non-binding parliamentary motions. Meanwhile, the production of
legislation continues independently with the government in the driver’s
seat: 98% of these bills are proposals of the government. The proposals to
put these bills on the agenda are not voted on. The agenda-setting process
on bills occurs behind closed doors. The opposition minority has practic-
ally monopolised debating, but the coalition majority monopolised
legislating.
Notes
1. Stecker (2008) finds no cases with so little government control as the
Netherlands in Central Europe either.
2. Handelingen 2010–2011 25/1/2011 (Offici€ele Bekendmakingen 2018).
3. Not participating in debates is not just “not done”, but also means that the
other parties that do participate in the debate will be able to control how
the issue the debate is on is framed and how it and what kind of
substantive proposals will be voted upon.
4. In Israel, parliamentary parties can propose motions for the agenda, which
are voted upon in the plenary. This is one way in which Members of the
Knesset can put items on the agenda. These issues however are referred to a
specific committee and the number of proposals per year voted upon is
small (Akirav 2014).
5. The “party-executives dimension” from Lijphart (1999)’s model.
6. They are preceded by a written exchange by specialist MPs . A plenary
majority can decide to only discuss the bill in committee.
7. To hold a plenary debate concerning a document already sent to a
committee, formally a proposal by the committee to debate it in the plenary
and a parliamentary majority are necessary (Tweede Kamer 2016, art.120).
Effectively, a parliamentary majority can debate chose to debate anything.
8. Handelingen 1999-2000 20/4/2000 (Offici€ele Bekendmakingen 2018).
9. The tool of the thirty-member debate however quickly blunted due to
overuse. When they were originally created, thirty-member debates were
called emergency debates (‘spoeddebatten’). This name soon proved
Orwellian as minorities requested so many debates that it was not unheard
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of to have to wait a year for a thirty-member debate to be planned. Hence
the name “thirty-member debate” was introduced and the number of thirty-
member debates that were held decreased from 65 in 2008 to 13 in 2016.
10. Except perhaps for those systems where the opposition has become so
demoralised that they no longer try to propose items for the agenda because
they know these proposals are unlikely to be adopted.
11. Decision making within the €Altestenrat is consensual (Sieberer 2006, p.60),
so the analysis on voting applies less in that case. The patterns for sabotage
may apply here because offering alternatives may be a good way to
undermine consensus on putting an issue on the agenda.
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Speaker! Last Thursday, it became clear from messages in the
media about the letter concerning asylum policy that the
junior minister of Safety and Justice would present on
Friday, that the “no fault criterion” and the quota for
illegals would continue to exist. I would like to have a
debate about this and involve the asylum letter in this.
4 MPs in favour
Speaker A request to hold a debate.
Schouw
(D66; opposition)
Wholehearted support, Madam Speaker. 16 MPs in favour
Fritsma
(PVV; opposition)
If the request is broadened to other aspects of asylum
policy, including the aspects that are liberalised, like the
detention of aliens, the Freedom Party can support
the request.
31 MPs in favour
Speaker You are requesting a plenary debate about the letter than
the junior minister has sent.
Fritsma Yes, the entire deal. Not just the things that Mrs. Voortman
has mentioned, but also for instance the liberalisation of
the alien detention. Indeed, the letter as a whole.
Speaker That is essentially the request of the GreenLeft at the
moment: a plenary debate about the letter of the junior
minister of Safety and Justice.
Leijten
(SP; opposition)
We have been waiting for elaboration by the junior
minister. Now we have seen this. I think it is very
appropriate that we talk about this in the plenary.
46 MPs in favour
Speaker Support for the debate, thus.
Azmani
(VVD; coalition)
According to the schedule we already have scheduled three
debates about the letter, so this would be the third
debate request about this letter. I feel that there is a
need for parties to have a debate about this. This can
be as soon as possible, but that depends on the
schedule of the Speaker. I can also imagine that via email
or in the committee procedural meeting, we could plan to
hold a general committee meeting about this letter. This
means that we do not support a fourth debate.






I think that this is a hot potato in the coalition. We serve
society if we discuss this issue in the plenary at length,
so wholehearted support for the proposal of
the GreenLeft.




I can imagine that we need to discuss this at length and
firmly, but it seems obvious to connect it to an already
planned debate.
48 MPs in favour
44 MPs against
Speaker So, no support.
Keijzer
(CDA; opposition)
Having heard the words of Mr. Azmani, it surely seems to
me a good moment to express support to the request,
in order to express that it is really necessary to speak
about this.




It seems very important to me to discuss these letters and
to discuss this letter in its entirety. We have to see how
we can plan this in as soon as possible. Given the
agenda, a general committee meeting seems most
obvious, as well as to arrange this in a written procedure.
61 MPs in favour
82 MPs against
Speaker So, no support for a plenary debate.
Maij No, not at the moment.
Klein (50Plus;
opposition)
Support for a plenary debate. This seems
sufficiently urgent.
63 MPs in favour
82 MPs against
(continued)
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I see that the coalition is unwilling to come along, which
means we must plan a thirty-member debate. That
would mean three minutes to speak. This is a broad
subject, so I would not wish that for the debate. We
would cut ourselves short, so then we opt for general
committee meeting with broad speaking time and
possibly a longer general committee meeting than we
have planned.
63 MPs in favour
87 MPs against
Schouw If I understood the Labour Party and the Liberal Party
correctly, they indicated that they wanted a plenary
debate, but given the agenda … With other words, if
the Speaker would see room on the plenary agenda …
That is how
I understood it.
Speaker No, both were very explicit in their second halves: no support
for a plenary debate. I can do nothing else but determine
that the majority in the House has expressed that there is
no need for a plenary debate at this moment. That was
the last thing that Mrs. Maij added. The advantage of the
regular procedure is that there is space in the committee
for an extended written round to discuss things from the
letter in greater detail. That is what I’ll add. That is the
procedure we have in the House. In that way we can
deepen some elements. And I have heard from everyone,
Mr. Schouw, that this is exactly what is needed. There is
no majority for holding a majority debate.
No debate held.
Voortman That is too bad. We will take care of this via
the committee.
Sentences indicating support or opposition in bold; First sabotage attempt in italics.
# Category
1 Macro-Economic Issues and Taxes
2 Civil Rights, Immigration & Civic Integration
3 Health
4 Agriculture & Fishery
5 Labour




12 Justice, Judiciary & Crime
13 Social Welfare
14 Housing and Urban Development
15 Enterprise, Domestic Trade and Commerce
16 Defense
17 Science, Technology & Communication
18 Foreign Trade
19 Foreign Affairs and Development Aid
20 Government Operatios, Civil Service & Intergovernmental Relations
21 Public Nature and Water Management
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